Lessons from June 2013 disaster of Uttarakhand

Small or big every incidence has some lessons in store for us, and intelligent are those who don’t wait to learn from incidences, and instead learn from the experiences gained by others.

The lessons alone are however of little use unless these are acted upon. Hope some find their share of action points in the experiences of the June 2013 Uttarakhand disaster.

Telecommunication

Hurriedly communicated initial message regarding disaster incidence over Police wireless in the evening of Sunday June 16, 2013 – around 30-40 persons washed off together with some parked vehicles from Gaurikund – and there was complete information blackout till the morning of Tuesday June 18, 2013.

Mobile connectivity was disrupted soon due to electricity failure, shortage of fuel to run the generators, and other technical snags while batteries of mobile phones were drained off while still trying to search the network.

There were no updates from the Mandakini valley with the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC). Besides delaying initial response this added to confusion as different versions started being aired by the media due to lack of authentic information. This added to panic, and trauma of disaster-affected population.

The district no doubt had satellite phone but that was kept at the district headquarter.

Steady inflow of updated, authentic, and reliable information is vital for effective management of any disaster.

Robust, and reliable communication system with at least triple redundancy should put in place.

Satellite phones should always be stationed at vulnerable, and remote areas.

Alternative power arrangements should be made for keeping mobile towers functional.

Mobile service be included under essential services, with instructions for the service providers to ensure their operationally at all times by maintaining adequate stock of fuel to operate the generators, and keep solar back up facility, particularly in the remote, and disaster prone areas.

Solar powered mobile phone recharging facilities should be created, particularly in remote areas that are visited by people in large numbers.

People venturing to these areas should be educated on ways of delaying discharge of mobile battery.

In view of suddenly increased communication load of SEOC a number of new telephone lines were hurriedly activated. Many telephone numbers, including some personal mobile numbers thus got circulated, and this amounted to confusion.

SEOC should have a single telephone number with multiple lines, and with capability of being upscaled during a major emergency. Dedicated four-digit toll-free number of SEOC (1070) should be utilised, and publicised for this purpose.

Personal mobile numbers of officials should not be made public as this distracts their attention from other important tasks.

Media briefing

Arrangements for media briefing, and providing information to next of kin of disaster-affected persons were not in place. This resulted in overcrowding at the SEOC and often disrupted its routine functioning.

After any disaster media personnel are under pressure to report the updates, and lack of authentic information results in rumors that add to the trauma of affected population, and demoralise the responders.

Arrangements should be made for media briefing at regular intervals by duly authorized persons having access to authentic, and updated information.

The media personnel be also provided assess to video feeds, and photographs of the incident, particularly ones depicting progress of relief and rescue. Besides satisfying the next of kin (NOK) of the affected persons this would boost the morale of the responders.

If possible arrangements be made for the visit of media personnel to the affected area.

Ones involved in operations should not be given responsibility of media interaction.

Media should in turn be discouraged from venturing into the SEOC.

Public information

SEOC was flooded with queries from NOK of persons perceived to be present in the state. Not conversant with the geography of the region callers were not sure if their NOK were actually present in the disaster affected areas.

Emotional state of callers warranted counseling, and consoling. Talking to them was no less than a trauma for people manning the SEOC. Moreover large number of callers could not communicate either in Hindi or English.

On the aftermath of any disaster it is normal for NOK of the affected persons to seek information on their welfare, and whereabouts for which dedicated arrangements are required.

Persons with special tele-counseling, and psychological consoling skills should be engaged during major disaster incidence for manning public information helplines. Or else those routinely sharing this responsibility be provided specific trained to do this professionally.

Special care should be taken in incidences with high probability of linguistic difference between the potential callers and responders. This becomes particularly pertinent if the disaster-affected area is visited by people from other states or nations in large numbers, as was the case of Kedarnath. In such incidences persons conversant with the language of the potential callers should be engaged. Assistance of pre-registered volunteers can also be taken for this purpose.

Information management

After a while information being received at the SEOC from different sources became so voluminous that it was difficult to process, segregate, and use it for decision making, planning and resource mobilisation. Moreover both officials, and non-officials started seeking synthesized, and specific information on various aspects of the disaster.

SEOC should be efficiently manned with adequate information handling, processing, and synthesising capabilities so as to use the same for decision making, particularly relating to response, and resource mobilization.

Relief and rescue

Difficulties were faced in the induction of responders to the disaster-affected area due to disrupted transport network. Though highly specialised, professionally trained, and well equipped, the response forces called in for search and rescue lacked intelligence on local geography, terrain conditions, weather related peculiarities, and resource availability.

Knowledge of local ground realities is often critical to the success of search and rescue operations, particularly in the mountainous terrain. Local people enjoy a distinct advantage on these points, and therefore their support should necessarily be mustered.

Local volunteers should be trained in search and rescue, and adequately equipped.

To ensure effectiveness specialised response forces raised by the state should be routinely subjected to ground familiarization, particularly in vulnerable, and remote areas.

Governance

On the aftermath of the disaster taking clue from the Comptroller and Auditor General report (CAG, 2010) the issue related to ineffectiveness of the State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) was repeatedly highlighted by the media. Besides maligning the image of the state, it adversely affected the morale of the responders.

For effective disaster governance it is a must to strengthen, and empower institutions responsible for disaster risk reduction; particularly SDMA, State Executive Committee (SEC), and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs). Most states are not paying due attention to the very fact that the Disaster Management Act, 2005 requires all executive actions to be taken either by SEC or DDMAs with SDMA being a policy making and supervising institution.

SEC, and DDMAs should be strengthened in the spirit of DM Act, 2005. A dedicated body should be created to provide secretarial support to the SEC.

Apart from various state government departments a number of other agencies including Army, IAF, NDRF, ITBP, Indian Navy, and DGBR were involved in response. Agency specific command structure, and reporting protocols hindered smooth information exchange, and coordination.

Disaster management being a multi–departmental affair, coordination, and unity of command are critical to the success of post–disaster operations.  

SOPs, and protocols pertaining to command structure, reporting formats, procedures, and information exchange should be clearly laid down, circulated, and rehearsed.

Registration of tourists, and pilgrims

Estimating the number of persons involved in the disaster of June 2013 was a major challenge. Due to lack of authentic information there were differing assertions that added to the confusion.

The pilgrimage be regulated, and persons be registered. Besides keeping track of exact number of visitors this would help in communicating with them in case of any exigency.

The pilgrimage circuit of the state lacks single entry point, and one can access the circuit from a number of points, has habitations till the very end, and local people routinely commute in large numbers. This would make differentiating pilgrims, and tourists difficult, and, registration challenging.

Strict registration, and other measures should however be implemented in areas where people have to trek; Kedarnath, Gomukh, Hemkund Sahib, Yamunotri, and Chota Kailash–Kailash-Mansarovar. In these areas only a specified number of persons should be allowed beyond the last road head at Gaurikund, Gangotri, Govindghat, Janki Chatti, and Tawaghat after duly registering their details.

People visiting high altitude shrines have often been facing health related emergencies, and a number of people, particularly on Gaurikund-Kedarnath trek, die every year due to various ailments.

Health check up should mandatory for persons venturing on high altitude trekking routes, and only physically fit should be allowed.

These persons should be briefed on the terrain, and weather conditions together with other associated terrain specific hazards. 

Support for evacuees

Large number of disaster-affected persons had lost all their belongings, and did not have enough money to manage their journey back home. These persons at the same time had no acquaintances around to look for help. The relief guidelines of the Ministry of Home Affairs (HMA) have no mention of such situations.

Arrangements were made for the return journey of the evacuees who were also provided cash assistance for covering en route expenses.

Rules for catering to such situations should be put in place, particularly for areas that are routinely visited by people from far, and wide in large numbers. This would ensure prompt dispatch of the disaster-affected persons to their destinations.

Surface connectivity

Most tourist, and pilgrim destinations in the Higher Himalaya have single road connectivity, and blockage of the same often results in persons being stranded in large numbers. Providing logistics support to the stranded persons, and ensuring their early evacuation thus often becomes a major concern for the state.

After the disaster of June 2013 more than 150000 persons were stranded at different places across the state due to disrupted surface connectivity. Despite best efforts major roads of the disaster affected area could only be opened for light vehicles in September–October 2013. Large number of stranded persons had to be therefore evacuated by air.

Surface connectivity in the region should be improved, and alternative motor roads be planned, and constructed so as to ensure alternative connectivity during disaster incidences.

In the disaster of June 2013 most motor roads in the proximity of rivers, and streams were washed off due to bank erosion.

Wherever possible the alignment of new roads should  be kept sufficiently away from rivers and streams.   

Aerial evacuation

Large number of helicopters were mobilized for evacuation of the stranded persons. These could not however be optimally utilised due to the constraints of airspace, helipads, and refuelling facilities. Bowsers could not be immediately moved in due to road disruption. Valuable operational time was thus lost in refueling of the choppers.

Helipads with adequate stock of ATF should be developed in the hills in the proximity of strategic, and disaster prone locations.

Besides prompt, and effective response, this would facilitate tourism, and adventure sports that in turn would boost the economy of the region.

Linguistic issues

Apart from foreign nationals the disaster involved people from more than 23 states of India. The disaster-affected persons thus exhibited distinct linguistic diversity, and large number of them could not communicate in a language that could generally be understood by the people of the state; Hindi and English.

The  pilgrims generally travel in large groups of which a few conversant in Hindi or English facilitate interaction. Communicating with persons dissociated from the group, particularly women, was a big challenge.

Relief, and transit camps organised for disaster victims should be adequately staffed with persons who are conversant with the language of the potential evacuees.

For this volunteers could be registered, and their services could be mobilized as the requirement arises.

Missing persons

Large number of persons went missing in the disaster of June 2013.

Legal procedure in India for declaring a missing person dead, S. 108 of Indian Evidence Act 1872, requires the missing person be unheard of for a minimum period of 7 years by the ones who would normally have information on her whereabouts. Moreover ex-gratia relief admissible out of SDRF can only be provided to the next of kin (NOK) of those deceased in the disaster incidence.

The SDRF guidelines have no mention of the persons missing in disaster incidence.

Besides claiming relief the next of kin of the missing persons required death certificate for settling various familial, societal, official, and legal issues.

At that time there existed no guidelines for declaring missing persons as being dead due to which disbursement of relief, and death certificates was delayed. This added to the trauma of the NOK of the missing persons.

This issue could only be resolved after the Registrar General of India (RGI) issued fresh guidelines on August 16, 2013, and prescribed the procedure to be followed for declaring missing persons as being dead, and issuing death certificates.

This arrangement however was specifically for the disaster of 2013, and on the aftermath of the February 2021 Dhauliganga tragedy the state government had to again request the RGI for fresh guidelines for declaring missing persons dead.

Standardised guidelines, and procedures should be put in place for declaring persons missing in disaster incidences as being dead so that the NOK of the deceased persons are not unnecessarily traumatised.

Evacuation

Injured, ill, elderly, women, and children are generally accorded priority in evacuation, and this thumb rule was followed on the aftermath of this disaster as well. This went on well till there were injured, and ill around but after that people resisted being  dissociated from the group.

It was soon realised that the people had come over in close knit groups from far and wide, and had no familiarity with the area or acquaintances around. In many such groups only 1-2 persons could speak, and understand Hindi or English, and for the females taking to strangers, particularly males was taboo. In such a situation disassociating from the group, that too after experiencing such a major disaster infused sense of insecurity.

The ones evacuated alone in the initial phase thus denied to leave till others in the group were evacuated. This added to the burden of ones engaged in relief, and rescue operations. Taking clue from the experience it was later decided to evacuate people in groups rather than segregating them on the basis of age, and sex.

Evacuation priorities should be decided only after fully understanding the situation as also composition of the affected population.

Needs assessment

Large volume of relief supplies that reached the disaster-affected area were  actually not required, and handling of the same only added to the burden of the officials. Packaged water, and old clothes were amongst such items; former was not required, and only added to trash while the latter was not socially acceptable.

Rapid needs assessment should be undertaken after a major disaster.

The assessed requirements should be widely publicised together with items that are not acceptable to the people due to religious, cultural, and other reasons.

Particular attention should also be paid towards safe disposal of the packing material, and other waste, and littering should be avoided.

Balanced response

High media attention resulted in initial concentration of rescue, and relief efforts in Kedarnath-Hemkund Sahib area. Ease of access for the media personnel to the centre stage of post-disaster operations due to aerial rescue effort in this area further strengthened this trend. To the ones following the disaster through media it seemed if the disaster was restricted to the Mandakini valley alone.

The assistance coming from civil society groups, and corporate houses was also concentrated in this region. This region therefore had excess of relief supplies as also other assistance while disaster affected areas of Pithoragarh, and Bageshwar did not receive much attention.

Moreover even within the Mandakini valley the stranded persons attained high attention while the affected local population was not adequately catered during the initial response phase.

Response, and relief, particularly after a major disaster should be well planned, and based on the assessment  of the holistic scenario, and needs.

Pre disaster coordination with civil society groups, and corporate houses is a must.    

Personal gear

On the aftermath of the disaster it was observed that large number of persons venturing to the high altitude areas did not have adequate clothing, and footwear due to which they were exposed to various ailments, injury, and hardships.

Persons visiting the region often do not have prior experience or knowledge of climatic conditions in the mountains where temperatures could drop drastically after rains, even in summers.

Moreover coming from plains where temperatures go quite high in summers it is hard for the visitors to contemplate need of carrying woolen clothing.

Together with this many people, particularly women are not used to wearing shoes. Walking on the hilly route with slippers or sandals often becomes painful, and cumbersome. This at the same time slows the pace of movement.

Information on the weather related peculiarities of the region together with clothing, and footwear related requirements should be made available to the potential visitors through various modes.

The ones proceeding on high altitude trekking routes should necessarily be advised to carry woolen clothing, sturdy footwear, and raincoat or umbrella. These items should at the same time be made available en route on sale.

Logistic support for visiting officials

The disaster involved people from more than 23 states of India, and senior officials from many states were deputed for ensuring safe evacuation of the residents of their state.

There were however no arrangements in place for routine briefing of these officials on geography and approach, terrain and weather conditions, ongoing and planned rescue efforts, and whereabouts and details of the evacuees.

Arrangements for logistics, and secretarial support for these officials were also not in place.

All this added to the workload of the personnel manning the SEOC, and carrying out other disaster management related duties.

Based upon the composition of routine visitors specific arrangements catering to the needs of the officials likely to come from different states or nations on the aftermath of a major disaster should be incorporated in the concerning SOPs.

VIP visits

On the aftermath of the disaster there were visits of many politicians, and other VIPs. Arrangements had therefore to be made for briefing, protocol, and press briefing of the visiting officials.

VIP visits should be discouraged after a major disaster.

Protocol related formalities that are attendant to VIP visits should be formally waived off for disaster situations so that the officials engaged in various post-disaster functions are not unnecessarily occupied.

The Union government should enact legislation to incorporate suitable provisions relating to this in Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Relief and rescue personnel

In view of the magnitude of the disaster large number of personnel of various state government departments were deputed to the disaster-affected, and other areas for taking care of various emergency support functions.

Unlike unformed services the civilian departments do not have a culture of working in shifts or rotation of persons undertaking stressful duties. These persons had to therefore carry out functions entrusted upon them continuously for long periods without any break. This had distinct adverse impact on the psychological health of these persons, and adversely effected their performance.

Working hours of persons engaged in post-disaster functions, both in the disaster-affected area, and SEOC should be fixed, and the ones engaged in stressful tasks should be rotated after a pre-determined interval.

This should necessarily be incorporated in the relevant SOPs.

As the post-disaster relief, and rescue period could be long drawn, particular attention should be paid towards psychological, mental and physical well being of the relief, and rescue personnel as any compromise on this could adversely effect quality, and effectiveness of their functions.

In the stressful post-disaster conditions, particular care should also be taken to ensure that these personnel get proper rest, and nutritious food together with quality time for entertainment, and exercise.

Safety of the responders

2013 disaster caused immense loss of human lives, and caused great sufferings upon the affected population. This disaster at the same time inflicted massive loss of responders. There were as many as four chopper crashes during the post disaster operations including one of the Air Force. As many as 48 responders were killed in the post-disaster operations and this includes the 22 killed in chopper crashes on June 25, and July 24, 2013.

There have been chopper crashes in post-disaster operations after that as well, and in 2019 three persons were killed in two chopper crashes on August 21 and 23, 2019 after the Arakot disaster.

Accidents during post-disaster operations have an adverse impact on the morale of the responders that could be reflected in their deteriorated performance.

Safety and security of the responders should therefore be accorded the highest priority. 

There is pressing need to educate all concerned on the basics of air operations, and need of ensuring safety of responders under all circumstances.

SPOs should be put in place for post-disaster air operations.

Special care should be taken to ensure that the responders use appropriate safety gear at all times,  adhere to safety protocol, and do not take unnecessary risk.

In case of major disasters an officer should specifically designated for ensuring safety of the responders, as also visitors.

Demobilisation of resources

On the aftermath of the disaster of 2013 large number of personnel, and resources were requisitioned from various agencies. These were often put under the control of the local administration of disaster-affected districts.

As there were no protocols or SOPs in place for the demobilisation of resources these were not relieved even after they had discharged functions assigned to them, and there existed no specific assignment for them.

In the absence of protocols, and SOPs the district administration was reluctant to certify that there was no requirement whatsoever for these resources, and therefore some of the resources were kept waiting for long periods. This was observed to be a cause of discontent for the agency that had spared their resources at the time of exigency.

It needs to be appreciated that in view of the emergency situation resources provided by various agencies are often pulled out of deployment at some other location.

Over the passage of time these critical resources might also be required at some other location.

All this is particularly relevant for the resources of the uniformed forces, as these are primarily meant for catering to security, and strategic requirements, and should necessarily be demobilised at the earliest after these have served their purpose.

Protocols, and SOPs should be put in place for the demobilisation of resources.

Ceremonial or official demobilisation with words of appreciation, and thankfulness would further help in building better understanding, and relations between the agencies.

Briefing and debriefing

Unlike uniformed forces the civilian departments do not have a culture of routine briefing, and debriefing of personnel engaged in different tasks.

After the disaster of 2013 large number of officials deputed by different departments were inducted to the disaster-affected area without formal briefing on their roles, and responsibilities. This often resulted in disrupted communication or chain of command. These officials were at the same time relieved without debriefing which resulted in vacuum, and disrupted continuity of functions. Formal documentation of important lessons learnt was also missed due to this.

SOPs should be put in place for routine briefing, and debriefing of the personnel engaged in post-disaster functions. These should preferably be organised at the time of change of shift or duty so that the outgoing party  provides information on the ongoing tasks, problems being faced, plan of work, and targets set for the coming period.

The party taking charge should at the same time be briefed on the chain of command together with reporting formats, and procedures.

Media awareness

On the aftermath of the disaster it was observed that the media personnel, in their bid to make the news sensational, and salable, often resorted to reporting of personal routine, and eating habits of the relief, and rescue personnel. This often resulted in personal embarrassment besides demoralising the relief, and rescue personnel.

Media should be educated to respect privacy of the responders.

Good mental, psychological, and physical health of responders working in stressful conditions is a must for the success of the operations, and for this they have to be provided nutritious food, adequate rest, and recreational opportunities. To add to it the responders are in no way deprived of their right to personal liberty, and the same needs to be respected, and honoured under all circumstances.

Though in limited numbers, unauthenticated, fabricated, and inflammatory stories were reported while positive stories pertaining to acts of personal bravery, compassion, and empathy together with societal engagement were often not reported.

Media persons should be educated on their role in encouraging, and facilitating the masses to act, and proceed in the right direction by maintaining right proportion of positive new items.

In an effort to highlight the sufferings of the affected population as also irresponsible attitude of the officials photographs of mutilated bodies were sometimes circulated, particularly  in social media.

It needs to be stressed upon the media that personal dignity, and privacy of individuals should be respected even though they are dead. If possible, ethical guidelines for reporting should be prepared with the involvement of media personnel.

Legal issues

Soon after the disaster of 2013 a number of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) were filed in the apex court alleging non-performance on the part of the state, and seeking immediate judicial intervention for providing relief to disaster-affected population.

There were at the same time probes by the various quasi-judicial statutory bodies including State and National Human Rights Commission, National Commission for Women, National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights, and National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These often sought information specifically pertaining to the affect of disaster on their interest group, and measures taken by the state to cater to their requirements.

As the state does not differentiate amongst disaster victims on the basis of sex, age, caste, and creed the queries of the quasi-judicial statutory bodies could not be addressed satisfactorily.

No arrangements were in place for addressing legal issues and the data was also not specifically segregated to cater to the queries of the various quasi-judicial statutory bodies. Therefore the ones involved in other important post-disaster functions, but familiar with the sequence of events, and progress of relief and, rescue measures had to be spared for preparing the replies.

Legal issues likely to spring up on the aftermath of a disaster should be reviewed, and accordingly manpower should be deployed for addressing these. Apart from knowledge of legal issues the person entrusted with this responsibility should be exposed to ongoing post-disaster efforts, and initiatives so as to gain familiarity with these.

The national government should take a call on this important issue, and incorporate suitable provisions in the Disaster Management Act, 2005 that disallow judicial interference for an agreed upon duration after a major disaster when the state machinery is engaged in addressing other important, vital and pressing issues.

Warning generation and dissemination

On the aftermath of the disaster some India Meteorological Department (IMD) officials, particularly in workshops, and seminars, claimed that the warning of the disaster around Kedarnath was communicated to the responsible authorities of the state, and attributed the tragedy to the inaction of the state machinery. This created an awkward situation for the participating state officials.

The information received at SEOC from IMD was however nothing more than a general forecast of particularly heavy rainfall all through the state.

With location specific, and definitive warning of the impending disaster many precious lives could have been certainly saved. The disaster of June 2013 thus reiterates the need of having a reliable, and robust warning generation, and dissemination infrastructure.

Reliable warning, and its effective communication in a decipherable manner to the population likely to be affected by the incidence is the key to saving human lives, and mitigating losses. To be effective warning should however have sufficient lead-time, and be precise in space, time, and magnitude.

With the present state of scientific knowledge, and technological advancement it is possible to generate, and disseminate warnings of hydro-meteorological events well in advance. Sufficiently dense network of meteorological observatories with real time data transmission capability is however a precondition for this, particularly in the Himalayan region where weather parameters are highly variable over short distances.

Such a meteorological network should be put in place, and integrated with rainfall threshold based flood, and landslide models to generate reliable warnings well in advance. This system should have capability of immediately communicating these warnings to the grassroots level, in a manner that suggests actions to be initiated by people at large.

As the region is visited by tourists, and pilgrims in large numbers, mobile messaging service with provision of automatic delivery of multilingual warning to all active mobile phones in the area likely to be affected by the said warning could be a viable option for this.

At the same time arrangements should be made for prominently displaying warning messages at places where people gather in large numbers; bus/railway stations, taxi stands, transport registration offices, tourist information/registration centres, prominent road diversions, and the like.

 The warnings should also be aired through FM, community radio, and other networks as also telecasted through television channels. Provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 should be utilised for ensuring overriding priority to these warning messages.    

It however needs to be understood that it is not easy for the masses to understand the implications of the warning received in their specific context. Moreover the warning received is of little use if the recipient is unaware of the course of action to be followed.

For the effectiveness of the warnings it is therefore necessary to undertake highly visible, and aggressive mass awareness drive.

Settlement pattern

Most losses caused by the disaster were generally observed to be restricted to the proximity of rivers, and streams not only in 2013 but also in 2010, and 2012. Traditionally the people of the area maintained safe distance from streams, and settled down over middle or higher slopes of the hills. Alignment of motor roads along the rivers together with ease of construction, and associated commercial incentives in the proximity of road have lately induced people to settle down close to the streams, and rivers.

Landuse zonation clearly identifying high hazard zones should be undertaken, and anthropogenic activities in close proximity of rivers, and streams as also in identified hazard prone areas should be banned.

Aggradation

The issue of fast pace of aggradation in the disaster affected area, and ensuing enhanced vulnerability of many low-lying areas in the proximity of rivers, and streams was highlighted after the disaster of 2013. Uttarkashi, Bageshwar, and Sonprayag were amongst the settlements facing this problem.

Reduced transport, and erosion capacity of the rivers, and streams due to arrested, and regulated flow due to the construction of barrages, and dams, and increase in the debris production due to enhanced pace of developmental initiatives, landslides, and surface erosion in the hills are held responsible for this.

Debris production certainly cannot be ruled out while undertaking developmental works in the hills but the present practice of rolling down the debris aggravates mass movement, and deforestation besides degrading soil, and water quality. The debris often overruns productive agricultural lands, water sources, and other assets. All the loose material ultimately reaches the riverbed, and enhances the pace of aggradation, and adversely affects productive life, and storage capacity of the associated reservoirs.

Practice of unscientific disposal of debris should be immediately discontinued, and a debris disposal policy should be enacted for ensuring safe, and systematic disposal of excavated material, and debris with adequate punitive measures for non-compliance.

Risk transfer

The disaster derailed the economy of the region that is largely dependent upon pilgrimage, and tourism. Large number of persons engaged in hospitality, transport, tourism, and related sectors faced severe hardships due to sudden, and unexpected downfall in the number of pilgrims, tourists, and others visiting the region.

In a bid to infuse new vigor into the economy the state resorted to waiving off state dues besides enhancing the rate of relief admissible to disaster victims, and bringing losses of almost all categories under the umbrella of relief. Thus relief was also provided for losses incurred to commercial establishments. All this amounted to massive burden upon the public exchequer.

Risk transfer should be made a precondition for operating any commercial establishment, and the same should be linked to licensing of these establishments.

Risk transfer measures should also be promoted amongst general public, and financial institutions, particularly banks should be persuaded to ensure insurance of all assets created with their assistance.

Besides reducing the burden upon the public exchequer in case of a major disaster incidence, this would better compensate the disaster-affected population.

Risk transfer at the same time has the potential of compensating indirect losses incurred to enterprises due to disaster incidences. 

Risk informed decision-making

Post-disaster review of the situation brought forth the issue of risk assessment, risk communication, and risk informed decision-making. All these were observed to be missing, and where present not dovetailed with developmental initiatives of various departments. Therefore risk of the hazards was not being taken note of even while taking planned organisational decisions.

Unaware of the potential risk masses were also observed to do what suited them best.

It was also observed that despite a strong tradition of disaster risk reduction people were not following the age old, and time-tested principles that ensured safety of their community in this hazard prone terrain for generations. Lately people have started to settle down dangerously close to rivers, and streams, and over riverine terraces that were traditionally left for agriculture alone. The people were also observed to have discontinued traditional earthquake-safe construction practices.

All this is attributed to (i) status attached to modern infrastructure, (ii) social stigma attached to traditional practices that are considered backward, (iii) peer pressure, (iv) emulation, (v) lack of patronisation, and promotion of traditional practices by the state. All these have enhanced vulnerability of the masses in the hills.

Detailed risk assessment should be undertaken, and the state is in fact congratulated for quickly undertaking this exercise with the support of the World Bank. It however needs to be appreciated that this exercise would go futile if the results are not disseminated amongst the masses in an easily decipherable manner, and in vernacular. Moreover this database would soon become obsolete if not updated soon.

Together with this appropriate, site specific, and simple risk reduction options should be made available, and popularised.

Traditional architectural precepts, and others should be incorporated in all state sponsored constructions to  popularise these amongst the masses.

At the same time research on traditional disaster risk reduction practices should be promoted, and special incentives should be provided for researchers. This would facilitate improvement, and amalgamation of traditional practices with modern science, and technology to produce socially acceptable, economically viable, innovative, and sustainable disaster risk reduction solutions.

Mass awareness

Mass awareness is universally accepted as being a highly potent risk reduction tool that ensures voluntary compliance of disaster safety measures by the masses, thereby averting disaster induced losses, and building a culture of safety, and resilience. It is a reality that Fading Affect Bias makes people forget previous disaster incidences, and they therefore tend to again engage in activities which caused losses in the past.

It is therefore necessary to keep reminding the masses of their vulnerability, and locally pertinent examples have been found to be highly effective for this. Many countries across the globe including Japan, and Taiwan have therefore created disaster memorials where structures damaged by disaster are conserved to particularly highlight the features that caused the devastation together with proposed modifications that could have averted the losses.

These remind the masses of the misery, sufferings and losses that were inflicted on them due to their ignorance, and thereby the resolve not to repeat these mistakes is imbibed deep in their subconscious mind. This facilitates voluntary compliance of all disaster safety measures by the masses.

It is a welcome initiative that the state government has decided to observe Disaster Mitigation and Awareness Day on June 16 every year. Hope this brings forth mass awareness, and resilience.

This should however not turn out to be yet another official commemoration day with eyewash activities, and no involvement of the masses.

In this regard we can learn from Nepal where Earthquake Safety Day is celebrated every year on Magh 2 to bring forth mass awareness.