Reminiscence: June 2013 disaster of Uttarakhand

Exactly 8 years have passed, and all that transpired is still fresh, even bit-by-bit; the impact, the devastation, as also the lull that followed. Except for sudden short-lived disturbances weather is generally fair around the middle of June but on Friday June 14, 2013 it was raining from the previous day, and the downpour was uninterrupted, and particularly heavy. Call it intuition, caution or something else, but the Secretary, Disaster Management Bhaskaranand was present at the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) in the Uttarakhand Secretariat premises in Dehradun all through the weekend. And he was not alone; the Commissioner, Garhwal Division Suvardhan, and the Executive Director,Disaster Mitigation and Management Centre (DMMC) Piyoosh Rautela were also around, as also a number of media representatives. In the afternoon they all went around the city, particularly towards Vikasnagar along with media personnel to have an idea of the water surge in the torrents entering the Doon valley from the hill ranges to the north.

The media, as usual was anxious to know if this unusual downpour results in some major incidence. Being present at the SEOC enhanced their chances of contributing “breaking news”. Except for some landslides here and there, and blockade of roads there was however nothing significant.

The unexpected, and unthought-of was then heard. Late in the evening of Sunday June 16, 2013 there was a message over Police wireless; around 30-40 persons washed off together with some parked vehicles from Gaurikund.

The District EOC (DEOC) had nothing to add, and in fact DEOC was literally not aware of what all was transpiring in the upper reaches of the Mandakini valley. Nothing of that incidence could actually be confirmed from anywhere. It seemed that the rains have snapped all links, and there was a complete lull. Though not confirmed, the report was circulated to all concerned in the late evening itself.

Even though reports of disrupted roads, and stranded persons were being received from different districts there was no news from the Mandakini valley as all communication links were snapped from the late evening of June 16, 2013. It was still raining continuously; adverse weather, and terrain conditions did not allow alternative probe of any kind.

An unconfirmed wireless message followed by total information blackout was however enough to set alarm bells ringing. Everyone around apprehended a major mishap, and some media reports actually started pushing reports of a major disaster. The lull continued, and even the district administration did not have any update. To make the matters worse the District Magistrate suffered a cardiac dysfunction, and was hospitalized.

Everyone around was apprehensive but could do nothing. Based on the wireless message most vernacular newspapers on June 17, 2013 reported possibility of a major disaster around Rambara together with losses incurred in Uttarkashi, Pithoragarh and other districts. Electronic media was quick to search the archives for the clippings of 2010, and 2012 disaster around Uttarkashi. By the forenoon pressure of media, as also officials for confirmed updates started to mount. EOC however had no updates to share.

All were however not equally unaware, rumors of major human tragedy spread faster than wild fire, and in the evening of June 17, 2013 three Air Force choppers landed at Jollygrant. Receiving air support without formal requisition confirmed the apprehension.

Thereafter in the morning hours of June 18, 2013 with the landing of Air Force chopper at Kedarnath vivid stories of human suffering, death, and destruction started to unfold amid slowly accelerating humanitarian relief, and evacuation efforts.

The June 16-17 disaster of Uttarakhand was the biggest human tragedy of recent times, and had features that were unthought-of previously.

Yes, it was in fact a peculiar disaster in many ways.

• In most disaster incidences the concerned authorities are able to quickly gather rough estimates of the likely causalities, and the same is confirmed soon thereafter by headcount. This was however not the scenario in 2013. Most of the affected being pilgrims or tourists no one had an idea of the numbers, and even after eight years the numbers are not yet settled finally.
• To add to it the local habitations suffering major causalities did not have physical damages or loss of infrastructure as most people died away from their villages around Kedarnath, Rambara and Gaurikund.
• The disaster was a severe blow to the life support strategy of the affected families, particularly those of Uttarakhand as (i) most killed in the incidence were male bread winners of the family (76 and 20% of the 852 of Uttarakhand killed were respectively male, and children),  (ii) there was a severe loss of productive assets such as mules, horses, and shops.
• The disaster had a severe long term adverse impact on the economy of the region that is largely dependent upon tourism, and pilgrimage. This is evident from 60-97% fall in the number of tourists, and pilgrims as compared to pre-disaster numbers.
• Moreover, amid the scare of global warning the region witnessed particularly chilling, and extended winters with higher reaches experiencing snowfall till March 2013. Fresh snow was therefore abundantly present in huge quantities in the higher reaches around the time of the disaster.
• Even though environmentalists still attribute this tragedy to anthropogenic interventions, particularly hydropower projects, the script of the disaster was written in sparsely populated Higher Himalayan region of that is bereft of anthropogenic pressure of any kind.
• Monsoon arrived around a week before its normal schedule, and caused excessively heavy rainfall right from the beginning; augmented by 440% rainfall in the state between June 15 and 18, 2013 was 385.1 mm against the normal of 71.3 mm. This was later attributed to the confrontation of the SW monsoon front with the Westerlies.
• The upper reaches, particularly the Alpine zone usually does not receive liquid precipitation. Around the time of the tragedy in 2013 there was however indiscriminate heavy rains in the entire higher Himalayan zone of Uttarakhand from Arakot on Pabbar–Tons in the west to Askot on Kali in the east.
• The raindrop impact facilitated fast melting of the fresh show that was present in abundance in the higher reaches due to late, and heavy snowfall. The snowmelt added to the surface flow that enhanced the discharge of the mountain streams, and rivers.
• All the major rivers of the region; Yamuna, Bhagirathi, Alaknanda, Mandakini, Pinder, Ramganga, Saryu, Goriganga, and Kali suddenly, and almost simultaneously crossed danger level; the level of Mandakini at Rudraprayag was recorded 7.5 meters above the danger level on June 18, 2013.
• Though most people know of the devastation in Mandakini valley, particularly Kedarnath which is attributed to high media coverage, entire Higher Himalayan region of Uttarakhand from Kali valley in the east to Yamuna valley in the west was devastated by this disaster with 5 of the 13 districts of the state, namely Rudraprayag, Chamoli, Uttarkashi, Bageshwar, and Pithoragarh being worst hit.

As we know howsoever severe a hazard be it can never cause a disaster unless communities, and infrastructure are exposed to it. At this juncture it is important to note that certain factors severely enhanced human presence in the region around the time of the June 2013 disaster.

• Higher Himalayan region of the state houses Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri, and Yamunotri shrines of Hindus together with Hemkund Sahib of Sikhs. The region also has Valley of Flowers, Adi Kailash, and Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra route. Being located in higher reaches all these are assessable for a limited period between May-June, and September-October; exact dates of opening, and closing of the shines being decided by customary rules that have no relation with actual access, and weather conditions.
• These witness high influx of people in the beginning of the season due to (i) pleasant weather conditions, (ii) less of rains, and road disruptions, and (iii) summer vacations in schools, and collages.
• Pilgrimage was however late to start in 2013; Kedarnath, and Badrinath shrines opened to public on May 14, and May 16 respectively while Gangotri, and Yamunotri opened on May 13. This delay of almost a fortnight resulted in congregation of large number of people who wanted to finish the pilgrimage before the onset of rains.
• Horses, and mules that are popular means of transport on Gaurikund-Kedarnath trek route were not being operated during the time of the disaster due to Uttarakhand High Court order on the issue of sanitation on the pedestrian route. This slowed the pace of movement, and the pilgrims who could have easily travelled back to Gaurikund on mule or horse back were forced to stay overnight at Kedarnath or Rambara.
• Moreover routine helicopter service from Guptakashi or Phata to Kedarnath was suspended a couple of days before the disaster due to continuous rainfall resulting in poor visibility. Thus the ones intending to travel by air and return the same day had to travel on foot, and stay overnight at Kedarnath or Rambara.
• Continuous heavy rainfall severely slowed the pace of movement, and many people were forced to change their travel plan, and stay overnight at Kedranath or Rambara.

With rivers flowing above danger level, and colluvial material on vulnerable slopes highly saturated with water, the hazard level was extremely high. This was coupled with the presence of people in large numbers at vulnerable places in the proximity of the rivers; high exposure level. The recipe of a major disaster was thus ready.

The disaster unfolded in the form of a series of flashflood, landslide, debris flow, and toe erosion incidences, and in one go all the highways were blocked, and more than 1,50,00 people were stranded at various places.

Aftermath of the disaster

Magnitude of human loss together with large number of persons stranded at various places in Mandakini, and Alaknanda valleys; particularly at Kedarnath, Bhimbali, Gaurikund, Hemkund Sahib, Ghagharia, Govindghat, and Badrinath resulted in high media coverage of these areas. Relief and rescue efforts were thus initially focused on these areas.

Concentration of aerial rescue operations provided easy access to media personnel even to the remotest areas. This in turn reinforced media coverage of these areas, and it was projected initially that the other areas are safe from the disaster. The rescue and relief efforts were thus initially focused on Mandakini, and Alaknanda valleys, and the people in other disaster-affected areas of the state could not get immediate, and adequate attention.

All communication links with Mandakini valley were snapped in the evening of June 16, 2013. Adverse weather and terrain conditions did not provide opportunity of resorting to alternative probes. The outside world as also the district administration therefore remained unaware of the events in Mandakini valley till 18^thJune 2013.

With improved weather, and visibility aerial rescue operations were reinforced with 69 permanent, and temporary helipads being activated, and more than 80 choppers, and fixed wing crafts of various agencies pressed into service. Despite constrains of bad weather, airspace, and helipad limitation, and refuelling constraints 39165 persons were evacuated by air alone, and this proved out to be the biggest aerial evacuation ever attempted.

Ground search and rescue operations were slightly delayed due to washing off of motor roads as also pedestrian track leading to Kedarnath and Hemkund Sahib at many places. The evacuees from Mandakini, Alaknanda, and Bhagirathi valleys were first brought to then operational road head at Guptakashi, Joshimath, and Chinyalisaur respectively. 586 buses, and 1440 taxies were requisitioned for evacuation, and 71 relief camps were organised across the state that catered to food, shelter, medical, and other needs of 151629 persons for different durations.

Arrangements were made for the return journey of the evacuees who were also provided cash assistance to cover their in-journey expenses as they had lost their belongings.

Despite best efforts evacuation could only be completed on June 23, 2013. Rescue operations were however not risk free, and 4 choppers crashed during rescue operations. 48 persons engaged in rescue operations including 5 of IAF, 9 of NDRF, 6 of ITBP, and 28 of State Police, Revenue, Forest, and Civil Aviation Departments lost their lives while engaged in rescue operations.